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The differential risk of unemployment across UK regions and population sub-groups is 
well recognised. The extent to which residential location and individual heterogeneity 
contribute to the duration of unemployment is, however, difficult to discern. This paper 
investigates the impact of individual heterogeneity and regional influences on 
unemployment duration utilising cross-section microeconomic data drawn from a 
representative random survey of individual job seekers for the English County of Kent. 
These individual-level data are unique in that they provide information concerning the 
personal characteristics of job seekers, alongside direct observations of both their 
reservation wages and job search behaviour. Such data are extremely rare and, to our 
knowledge, have never before been utilised in a regional context. Thus, the paper 
contributes to the empirical literature by analysing the extent to which individual 
heterogeneity and intra-regional variation in labour market opportunities impact upon the 
observed distribution of unemployment duration(s). This is an important issue for policy 
formation. Evidence of regional influences advocates a more active role for 
macroeconomic demand-led management and lends support to a more integrated strategy 
for the implementation of urban and regional policy in a climate where welfare to work 
schemes dominate attempts at increasing the employability of the unemployed.         2
I. Introduction 
Headline unemployment currently stands at one of its lowest rates in over two decades. 
Since 1992, claimant unemployment has fallen by almost 1½ million and on the ILO 
definition by nearly 1 million. Despite this fall, change to the headline rate of 
unemployment masks a far more complex pattern of UK unemployment. For many 
individuals unemployment is a short-lived affair. For others, the risk of repeated or 
prolonged periods of unemployment is high.
1 Repeated or prolonged unemployment 
spells may reflect occupational choice or poor employability brought about by poor 
skills and/or repeated labour market exclusion. They may also reflect a lack of 
employment opportunities concentrated in specific geographical areas. Both facets 
amount to a significant detachment from work. They also contribute to growth in the 
level of non-working households and low pay.
2 These trends invariably underlie part of 
the observed deterioration in measures of relative poverty and income mobility over the 
last twenty years (Blanden et al, 2002). They also yield significant implications for the 
governement’s current policies concerned with social inclusion and the development of 
flexible labour markets. They are also relevant to the persistent unemployment problem 
in many European labour markets. 
 
The Theory of Job Search provides the theoretical basis for the analysis of labour 
market transitions via the process of worker separations. The timing of these separations 
also provides the conceptual framework for the analysis of unemployment spell lengths. 
The preference to analyse the duration aspect of unemployment is derived from 
considerations regarding economic welfare.
3 The frequency and average duration of 
unemployment reveal important information on the dispersion of unemployment across 
individuals. This information has significant policy implications. Increased duration of 
unemployment erodes individual incomes, depreciates human capital, and increases the 
inequality of employment opportunities and income distribution. The potential impact 
on economic development is great. Failure to tackle persistent unemployment 




Search theory emphasises flows into and out of unemployment, rather than the level of 
unemployment at any one time. The equilibrium or ‘natural’ rate of unemployment is 
asserted to be unaffected by the distribution of workers across labour market states or         3
the distribution in any period. Consequently, the theory focuses on the outflow rate from 
unemployment and interprets this as being equivalent to the probability that an 
unemployed individual finds work. In a steady-state, such analysis permits the 
unemployment rate to be expressed as the inflow into unemployment multiplied by the 
average time spent there (average duration is defined as the inverse of the outflow 
rate).
5 This link is of critical importance. Firstly, it provides a suggestive framework 
where aggregate unemployment may be investigated.
6 Secondly, it provides a method of 
identifying groups of workers with potentially low re-employment probabilities and, 
thus, those who are most likely to be at risk of long-term unemployment. Identifying the 
relative importance of workers’ characteristics may enable the formulation of policy 
that alters the pattern of flows among such groups. This, in turn, should yield desired 
alterations both to the incidence and experience of unemployment at both the national 
and regional level. 
 
The differential risk of unemployment across UK regions and population sub-groups is 
well recognised. However, the extent to which residential location and individual 
heterogeneity contribute to the probability of exit from unemployment is more difficult 
to discern.  Unemployment amongst men is consistently higher than it is amongst 
women. It is also higher for those groups of workers who are young, non-white, have no 
qualifications or operate in semi- or unskilled occupations (Jackman & Roper, 1987; 
Nickell, 1999). The prevalence of regional disparities in the incidence of unemployment 
is equally marked. In the Summer of 2002, the seasonally adjusted ILO measure of 
unemployment ranged from 3.8% in the South-East to 6.3% in the North-East. The 
variation in regional disparities at lower spatial units is even greater.
7 This variance in 
relative unemployment rates could reflect compositional effects brought about by the 
unequal distribution of population sub-groups. Brown & Sessions (1997) contest this 
view. They reveal that regional disparities in the risk of unemployment are prevalent 
even after controlling for a wide range of demographic characteristics. Associated 
economic implications are considerable. Regional disparities reduce output and raise 
inflationary pressure. They also constrain opportunities for unemployed workers in 
depressed areas and impose significant negative welfare effects where selective out-
migration of highly skilled workers causes low rates of economic activity to persist.  
         4
Extremely few studies analyse UK unemployment duration(s) within a region. Blackaby 
& Manning (1990a, 1990b, 1992) analyse the duration of regional unemployment to 
investigate the determination of regional earnings differentials. Jones & Manning 
(1992) utilise regional data to consider the role of the long-term unemployed in 
identifying hysteresis in the unemployment-vacancy relationship. Brown & Sessions 
(1997) explore the relative effects of demographic and regional influences utilising a 
profile of UK unemployment. They indicate that regional location is significantly 
correlated with unemployment, even when individual characteristics of the unemployed 
are taken into account. This relationship is even more significant for the long-term 
unemployed. Warren (1997) provides further credence here. Utilising a sample of long-
term unemployed males, he reveals regional factors affecting the arrival rate of job 
offers to be again significant when controlling for an array of personal characteristics. 
There is also little evidence to suggest a role for self-limiting behaviour.
8 
 
This paper investigates the impact of individual heterogeneity and regional influences 
on unemployment duration utilising cross-section microeconomic data drawn from a 
representative random survey of individual job seekers for the English County of Kent. 
These individual-level data are unique in that they provide information concerning the 
personal characteristics of job seekers, alongside direct observations of both their 
reservation wages and job search behaviour.
9 The availability of such data is rare. Hence, 
this paper contributes to the empirical literature by analysing the extent to which individual 
heterogeneity and intra-regional variation in labour market opportunities impact upon the 
observed distribution of unemployment duration(s). In particular, the paper analyses the 
extent to which the duration of unemployment is determined by individual choice. This is 
an important issue for the formation and evaluation of policy. If individual choice is found 
to significantly influence the conditional probability of exit from unemployment then the 
efficacy of current microeconomic supply–side initiatives such as ‘The New Deal’ and 
other welfare to work policies is supported. The existence of regional influences, by 
contrast, advocates a more active role for macroeconomic demand-led management. It also 
supports a more integrated strategy for the implementation of urban and regional policy 
such as the recent creation of Frameworks for Regional Employment and Skills Action 
(FRESAs).
10  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next Section presents a brief 
overview of Job Search Theory and its relevance to the analysis of unemployment spell 
lengths. Section 3 describes the data extensively. Section 4 formulates an empirical 
model of unemployment duration tied closely to the theory of job search. Section 5 
outlines the methodology utilised in the estimation of the empirical model. Empirical 
results and discussion are reported in Section 6. Section 7 summarises and concludes. 
 
 
II.  The Job Search Approach: A Brief Overview 
Job search theory asserts that the transition or exit probability out of unemployment 
depends on two factors: Firstly, the probability that the worker receives a job offer; and 
secondly, the probability that the job offer is acceptable. An acceptable job offer is a 
random offer drawn from the wage distribution that exceeds the worker’s reservation or 
minimum acceptance wage, that is, the wage that makes the individual indifferent to 
being employed or unemployed. In a stationary framework, this wage is constant and 
inversely related to search and opportunity costs. A job that offers a wage higher than 




The empirical literature on unemployment duration is vast and encompasses a variety of 
themes. Most of these studies utilise the ‘hazard’ approach to the analysis of 
unemployment and use individual data to estimate models that specify the conditional 
probability of exiting unemployment for a completed unemployment spell rather than 
focus on those determinants that directly affect the unemployment spell itself.
12 
Modelling the hazard or ‘exit’ rate provides indirect information regarding the 
determinants of unemployment duration. The probability that a worker receives a job 
offer is determined by personal and demographic characteristics. It is also dependent on 
prevailing labour market conditions. These factors influence similarly whether a job 
offer is acceptable. Personal characteristics such as age, gender, human capital and 
household composition play a vital role in determining individual preferences and 
hence, the formulation of an appropriate reservation wage. They are also likely to 
underpin an individual’s job search behaviour and related efforts to find employment in 
surrounding local labour markets. 
         6
Many studies evaluate the impact of the level and duration of unemployment benefit on 
unemployment duration (Atkinson et al, 1984; Narendranathan et al, 1985; 
Arulampalam & Stewart, 1995). Several studies extend this analysis to consider the 
impact of unemployment benefit receipt on job search behaviour (Wadsworth, 1991; 
Schmidt & Wadsworth, 1993) and the impact of targeted assistance schemes (Dolton & 
O’Neill, 1996). Theoretical models of job search assert that unemployment benefits 
lower the costs of search thereby raising individual reservation wages and the length of 
an unemployment spell. A small positive benefit effect on unemployment duration is 
commonly agreed upon.
13 However, this effect is sensitive to personal and demographic 
characteristics, elapsed duration, and prevailing labour market conditions. 
Narendranathan & Stewart (1993a) suggest that the benefit effect declines with 
unemployment spell length. By contrast, Meyer (1990) observes the hazard rate to rise 
prior to the expiration of unemployment benefit receipt. The evidence for a potential 
benefit effect on job search behaviour is also mixed. Wadsworth (1991) reports a 
statistically significant positive effect on search effort, that is, benefit claimants search 
more extensively than non-claimants. Schmitt & Wadsworth (1993), by contrast, reveal 
the level of benefits to exert no such impact.
14 
 
Sensitivity of the hazard to data stratification and sample selection suggest that the role 
of individual heterogeneity in the determination of unemployment spell lengths may be 
substantial.
15 Identifying the ‘true’ impact of individual heterogeneity is crucial to 
understanding both the characteristics of the long-term unemployed and the time 
dependency of the exit probability out of unemployment. Several empirical studies 
reveal the probability of exit from unemployment to increase with elapsed duration, that 
is, they reveal positive state dependence (Moffit, 1985; Meyer, 1990).
16 However, many 
studies reveal strong negative state dependence (Nickell, 1979; Atkinson et al, 1984; 
van der Berg & van Ours, 1994). Both genuine state dependence and individual 
heterogeneity can explain this observed decrease in the exit probability from 
unemployment. However, the presence of unmeasured or unobserved individual 
heterogeneity will bias estimates of the exit probability toward spurious negative state 
dependence. Intuitively, this arises if some unobserved characteristics intensify the 
transition of workers into re-employment. In this instance, individuals with higher re-
employment probabilities leave the sample first leaving behind those individuals who 
do not possess those unobserved characteristics. Over time, these less employable         7
individuals will come to dominate the sample, thus inducing a systematic bias toward 
stronger negative state dependence than actually exists. 
 
Distinguishing between ‘pure’ and ‘spurious’ state dependence has important 
implications for policy. The former implies that policies should be concerned with 
minimising unemployment durations across all sub-groups of workers.
17 The latter 
implies that policies should be targeted at those sub-groups who are disproportionately 
predisposed to longer durations. Recent studies utilising ‘flexible’ econometric 
specifications of the underlying exit rate from unemployment typically mitigate the role 
of unobserved heterogeneity in state dependence (Han & Hausman, 1990; 
Narendranathan & Stewart, 1993b). Nevertheless, observed and unobserved individual 
heterogeneity remains crucial to the unemployment process. 
 
Jones (1988) and van der Berg (1990) reveal individual heterogeneity and variation in 
the arrival rate of offers to be at least as important as the reservation wage in 
determining unemployment duration. Labour market conditions and individuals’ 
method(s) (and intensity) of job search are undoubtedly important here. It is 
acknowledged that the incidence and duration of unemployment are not uniformly 
distributed across geographical areas of the economy. The arrival rate of job offers 
depends on prevailing demand conditions in the labour market. Areas where the demand 
for labour is expanding will experience an increasing set of job opportunities, thereby 
exerting a positive effect on the arrival rate of offers. Lack of job opportunities in other 
areas has the converse effect. Of course, unemployment durations will also be 
dependent on individuals’ personal and demographic characteristics, their attractiveness 
to employers and vice versa. Lifetime employment histories, age, educational 
attainment and job search behaviour are important in this regard. Assessing the relative 
importance of such characteristics is essential, however, to gauging the impact of 
geographical variation in the arrival rate of offers. This, in turn, is crucial to 
understanding the role of ‘choice or chance’ in unemployment duration.
18 
 
Recent studies reveal that job search behaviour exhibits strong variation across 
individuals in similar socio-economic groups. The lack of an obvious explanation as to 
why similar individuals adopt differential search strategies may indicate that the choice 
of strategy be utilised empirically to proxy for the potential effects of unobserved         8
individual heterogeneity. This assumption suggests that individuals utilise alternative 
methods to signal their potential productivity relative to similarly skilled workers. 
Atkinson et al (1996) and Alpin & Shackleton (1997) report a large number of the 
employed to obtain their jobs using informal search methods.
19 By contrast, Urwin & 
Shackleton (1999) report the use of informal search methods by the unemployed to have 
a significant negative effect on the probability of exit from unemployment. These 
results suggest a differential role for job search methods across alternative labour 
market states. They also indicate distinct differences in the behaviour of individuals 
engaged in on- and off-the-job search.  
 
The effect that increased job search has on the exit probability from unemployment is 
potentially ambiguous. Increased search activity should result in an increase in the 
arrival rate of offers and hence a positive effect on the exit probability. However, a 
negative effect may also be observed.
20 Such ambiguity raises concern over the 
appropriate sign to expect on variables included in a reduced form econometric 
specification. Direct evidence on offer arrival rates is limited. However, there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that the unemployed reject very few job offers (Jones, 
1989; Holzer, 1988; van der Berg, 1990; Erens and Hedges, 1990).
21 Variation in 
acceptance probabilities also appears to be small (Wolpin, 1987). These results indicate 
that variation in the arrival rate of offers may be the major determinant of variation in 
unemployment durations. Gorter & Gorter (1993) support this result. They conclude 
that neither the level of unemployment benefit nor individuals’ reservation wages are 
important in ending a spell of unemployment. Instead, the offer arrival rate and those 
factors deemed to influence it provide the dominant means of escape. 
 
This paper explicitly addresses the impact of individual heterogeneity and regional 
influences on the duration of unemployment. We utilise cross-section data drawn from a 
regional survey of the stock of individual job seekers in the County of Kent at October 
1992. The dataset provides a rich source of information concerning personal and 
demographic factors along with individuals’ reservation wages and job search 
behaviour. The quality of this data permits us to investigate the extent to which 
unemployment duration is determined by individual choice. It also provides an insight 
into the role of geographical influences. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent an 
analysis of the issue of state dependence. Nonetheless, our results provide new insights         9
into the unemployment process and current policies aimed at increasing the 




We estimate individuals’ unemployment durations utilising cross-section 
microeconomic data drawn from a representative random survey of 5,392 interviews 
taken from Kent Employment Service records at October 1992. The survey accords well 
with Department of Employment records, accounting for 8 per cent of the unemployed 
in Kent at that time. Sample members were collated by drawing on a proportionately 
stratified sample of the unemployed by district. For each district, this sampling strategy 
ensures that the same proportions of persons are represented in the survey as for 
NOMIS.
22 Equally, it ensures that the distribution of unemployment be representative 
by age, gender and elapsed duration.
23  
 
We restrict analysis to those individuals in the survey who provide valid responses to 
those questions utilised in an econometric model that appears well informed by job 
search theory.
24,25 In addition, to alleviate potential biases in the reservation wage data, 
we symmetrically trim the data and omit the 0.5 per cent of those individuals with both 
the highest and lowest reservation wages. These restrictions result in a final sample of 
4,872 individuals. Tables A1 to A3 of the Appendix report the distribution of 
unemployment duration for this sample by age, educational attainment and district. 
Table A4 presents data definitions and summary statistics. 
 
The duration of unemployment is measured in interval form as months of registered 
unemployment. Figure 1 plots the distribution of unemployment durations. The 
distribution is positively skewed with 56 per cent of the sample having unemployment 
duration of less than six months, and 7 per cent having duration in excess of two 
years.
26 Table 1 reports the duration of unemployment by gender. This reveals that 
gender is important: men appear to be at greater risk of long-term unemployment. The 
proportion of women who are long-term unemployed (> 1year) is a little under 14 per 
cent. This contrasts with 23 per cent of men. This pattern of unemployment may reflect 
a greater probability of exit to non-participation for women. Thus, competing risks in 
the analysis of unemployment is clearly inferred.         1 0
  
The survey provides a rich source of demographic and personal information. Individual 
attributes available in the data include gender, marital status, educational attainment and 
previous occupation. Additional information regarding age, health, literacy and labour 
market mobility is also included. Educational attainment, age and previous occupation 
are important considerations in the analysis of unemployment. Younger workers 
typically face a higher incidence of unemployment than older workers. Their durations 
are, however, on average much shorter. Similarly, individuals with few or no 
qualifications are likely to experience longer durations of unemployment, as are those 
individuals who were previously employed in industries experiencing sectoral decline. 
Marital status and gender are important because of the strong link with labour force 
participation and family dependency. Increased dependency should exert a negative 
effect on unemployment duration. For men, this is likely to result in the transition to 
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Table 1 
Unemployment Duration by Gender 
 Male  Female  Total 
Duration Unemployed (months)  Persons  %  Persons  %  Persons  % 
0-3   1,074  29.0  411  35.0  1,485  30.5 
3-6 920  24.9  312  26.5  1,232  25.3 
6-12 868  23.5  294  25.0  1,162  23.8 
12-18 348  9.4  76  6.5  424  8.7 
18-24 198  5.4  40  3.4  238  4.9 
24+ 289  7.8  42  3.6  331  6.8 
Total  3,697 100 1,175  100 4,872  100 
 
 
Individual exit rates are also likely to be influenced by labour market mobility. The 
greater the distance and prospective travel time an individual is willing to consider, the 
greater is the perceived wage offer distribution and the probability that an acceptable 
job offer arrives. Data mining reveals that labour market mobility has a significant 
impact on the distribution of unemployment duration. Gender effects are also important 
here. The data reveals that 53 per cent of women are prepared to commute up to half an 
hour; 17 per cent are prepared to commute for an hour or more. This contrasts with 26 
per cent and 40 per cent of men respectively.
28 Access to one’s own transport is equally 
important. Seventy-five per cent of individuals with their own transport have 
experienced unemployment spells of less than 6 months, whilst 95 per cent have been 
unemployed for less than 1 year. This contrasts with 44 per cent and 70 per cent 
respectively for those without such transport.  
 
Reservation wages are derived from responses regarding the minimum weekly wage 
unemployed individuals would be prepared to accept in order to gain employment. Job 
search theory posits that the reservation wage should be less than or equal to the 
worker’s acceptance wage and more than the individual’s benefit entitlement. Lack of 
benefit data prevents this analysis. Reported reservation wages may, however, be tested 
using previous wages. This reveals that 72 per cent of unemployed respondents report a 
reservation wage less than or equal to their previous wage. This statistic appears 
meaningful given that the majority of worker separations occur as an exogenous process 
(i.e. they do not leave their jobs voluntarily). There is, however, significant variation by 
age and gender. Reservation wages increase with age. They are also markedly higher for         1 2
men perhaps reflecting the importance of industry and occupation structure (the mean 
reservation wage for men is £192 per week; for women it is £134).
29   
 
Table 2 reports individuals’ job search behaviour and unemployment duration. This 
reveals that 72 per cent of individuals utilise Job Centres as the main method of search 
activity.
30 Newspapers and journals account for 18 per cent, 7 per cent is attributed to 
speculative inquiries, and the remaining 3 per cent to private employment agencies and 
other methods. The proportion of individuals using speculative inquiries is relatively 
constant across the duration of unemployment. The use of newspapers/journals and 
private employment agencies are, however, dominated by the short-term unemployed. 
This disparity is further demonstrated by the reported use of Job Centres. Seventy-eight 
(78) per cent of those unemployed for between 12 and 24 months report Job Centres as 
their preferred method of search. This rises to 84 per cent for those unemployed in 
excess of 2 years. This pattern could indicate a discouraged worker effect. However, it 
may indicate the relative success of alternative search methods in exiting 
unemployment. 
Table 2 
Unemployment Duration and Search Activity 
Duration Unemployed 
(months) 





0-3   1,036  284  40  110  15  1,485 
3-6 882  237  15  85  13  1,232 
6-12 828  223  25  81  5  1,162 
12-18 335  68  5  15  1  424 
18-24 187  35  2  14  0  238 
24+ 279  32  1  18  1  331 
Total 3,547  879  88  323  35  4,872 
 
 
Finally, geographical variation in job offer arrival rates is captured by a set of district 
dummy variables.
31 These help to capture those effects brought about by institutional 
and industrial differences that are inherent in determining the occupational structure of a 
region and local labour demand. They also help to capture the spatial impact of 
commuting opportunities and distance effects brought about by close proximity to the 
major metropolitan area of London. The data reveals significant variation in the 
incidence and duration of unemployment across the county. Unemployment is 
concentrated in East and North Kent. Together, these districts account for 81 per cent of         1 3
the unemployed. They also account for a high proportion of the county’s long-term 
unemployment problem though the distribution is more mixed with the East Kent 
districts of Canterbury and Thanet having the highest and lowest proportion of persons 
long-term unemployed (66% and 19% respectively). Identifying such geographical 
variation is important and should help to capture variation in the arrival rate of job 
offers. This, in turn, is crucial to determining appropriate economic policy.   
 
 
IV.  The Empirical Model 
The standard job search model implies that both the reservation wage and hazard rate 
out of unemployment should remain constant over the length of an unemployment spell. 
The hazard or instantaneous probability of exiting unemployment is equal to the 
probability that a job offer is received, and the conditional probability that the offer is 
accepted by the unemployed individual. An acceptable offer is an offer whose wage is 
greater than the individual’s reservation wage.
32 
 
The hazard rate may be formally derived as:  
 
r (1 F(w )) τ=δ π −  (1) 
where τis the hazard rate, δ  is the job offer arrival rate, 
r w  is the reservation wage and 
F(w)is the cumulative distribution of wage offers. If the hazard rate (τ) is independent 
of elapsed duration, the implied distribution of completed unemployment spells T, will 
be exponential:  
 
T g(T) e
−τ =τ  (2) 
 
The data described in the previous section contains cross-section information for a stock 
of currently unemployed individuals. Thus, we are interested in the distribution of 
incomplete spells of unemployment rather than completed spells. The probability of 
observing an individual’s incomplete spell of length t, is the probability of a spell 
lasting t. This probability is given by the survivor function: 
  S(t) 1 G(t) e{ t} = −= − τ  (3) 
where G(t) is the cumulative distribution function for the density function g(t): 
  g(t) e( t) = τ− τ (4)         1 4













Integrating equation (2) over T to obtain G(t) and substituting into equation (5), the 
normalised survivor function may also be written:  
 
t p(t) e
−τ = τ  (6) 
 
Progression from equation (6) to an estimable model necessitates that additional 
structure be imposed. Firstly, an assumption must be made regarding the wage offer 
distribution. The most common and tractable assumption in this regard is that wage 
offers are drawn from a Pareto distribution. In this instance, the probability that a wage 
offer is acceptable and exceeds the reservation wage may be expressed as: 
 
r 1 F(wr) (A|w )
α −=  (7) 
 
r (A|w )
α ⇒τ=δ  
where A is the origin of the Pareto distribution andαis a scale parameter that may be 
interpreted as the constant elasticity of the hazard with respect to the reservation wage. 
Secondly, an assumption must be made regarding the functional form of the probability 
of receiving and accepting a job not accounted for by the reservation wage. For 
simplicity, an exponential function of the individual’s characteristics,  i X  is assumed: 
  ii Ae ( k X 'u )
α δ= +β + (8) 
where k is a constant, Xi a vector of non-stochastic regressors, β a vector of unknown 
parameters, and  i u  an independently identically normally distributed random variable 
with zero mean and variance
2 σ . Sections II and III outlined the types of explanatory 
variables that  i X  may represent. These are included to capture the effect of variation in 
the arrival rate of offers and the acceptance of such offers.         1 5
The expected log of incomplete unemployment duration ignoring variation in 
individuals can be expressed as: 
 
0
E(logt | ) log(s)p(s)ds
∞





−τ =τ ∫  
c log( ) = −− τ 
where  c is Euler’s constant. The expected log of incomplete unemployment duration 
conditional on individual characteristics may thus be written: 
 
rr r
ii i i E(logt|w ,X ) (c k) log(w ) X ' E(u |w ,X ) =− + +α − β−  (10) 
 
Renewal theory asserts that, if the flow into unemployment is constant over time, 
equation (10) may be treated as a regression model where the individuals used for 
estimation are a cross-section of unemployed people with incomplete durations at a 
particular point in time.
33 If the above assumptions are acceptable, the parameters of this 
model can be traced directly to job search theory and the model can be considered a 
structural model. If the assumptions are not acceptable, then equation (10) provides a 
valid reduced form regression from which the theory of job search provides guidance as 
to the types of explanatory variables to include. 
 
Endogeneity is of some concern in the above analysis. The structural interpretation of 
equation (10) holds only if the conditional expectation of the error term in equation (10) 
is zero. If reservation wages are correlated with omitted variables, the conditional 
expectation of the error term will be non-zero. In this instance, the use of instrumental 
variables (IV) will be necessary to avoid potential simultaneity bias and ensure that 
parameter estimates are consistent. The choice of instruments used to obtain predicted 
values of the reservation wage must be restricted to variables that affect the reservation 
wage and are correlated with, but do not affect, the arrival rate of job offers and the 
wage offer distribution. Gorter and Gorter (1993), and Jones (1989), utilise the level of 
unemployment benefits as an appropriate instrument. Information concerning benefit 
eligibility and benefit levels is not available in our data. Hence, we utilise individuals’ 
last reported wages and whether they were previously self-employed. These instruments         1 6
should exert significant impacts on individual reservation wages but are unlikely to 





Interval data presents a problem when utilised as a dependent variable in the estimation 
of an econometric model. Assigning the midpoint to observations in any given group 
may provide one method of undertaking. Assigning values to open-ended groups is, 
however, an ad hoc process that additionally fails to produce consistent parameter 
estimates. We overcome this problem by adopting the approach of Stewart (1983) 
which recognises that the upper and lower bounds of observed intervals provide 
important information for the consistent estimation of an econometric model.  
 
The latent structure of equation (10) is given by: 
 
'
ii i yX u i 1 , , n =β + = …  (11) 
where  i y  is the unobserved dependent variable (log of unemployment duration),  i X  a 
vector of non-stochastic regressors and β a vector of unknown parameters. The  i u  are 
assumed to be independently identically normally distributed random variables with 
zero mean and variance




ii y ~ (X , ) (i 1,...,n) Νβ σ =  (12) 
 
The observed information concerning the dependent variable is that it falls into a certain 
range on the real line. Let  k Α be the upper boundary of the 
th k  range. Then, the 
information on the log of unemployment duration is: 
  k1 i k y − Α <≤ Α  (13) 
The lower bound of unemployment duration is closed at zero but the upper bound is 
open ended. Thus, in logarithmic form, both end ranges are open-ended such that 
0 Α= − ∞  and  k Α= + ∞  where K is the number of groups. 
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The log likelihood of the above model is given by: 
 
''
K ki k 1i
k1 ik
XX
logL log F F
−
=∈
        Α− β Α − β   =∑ ∑ −         σσ         
 (14) 
ik k 1 log{F F } − = ∑−  
where F is the cumulative distribution of the standard normal. Consistent estimates of β 
and σ are obtained by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). 
 
 
VI. Empirical  Findings 
Maximum likelihood estimates for the log of unemployment duration are reported in 
Table 4. Column 1 presents the parameter estimates for the log of unemployment 
duration when the regression equation is interpreted as a structural model of job search 
theory. By contrast, the remaining columns present parameter estimates consistent with 
the reduced form interpretation of the econometric model. Column 2 reports the first 
stage of the IV procedure and presents estimates of the log of the reservation wage 
when explanatory variables and instruments are utilised in the estimation. Second stage 
estimates for the log of unemployment duration are reported in Column 3. 
 
Column 2 reveals that parameter estimates for the log reservation wage equation appear 
to be both meaningful and appropriate in that they are consistent with what would be 
expected  a priori. Reservation wages are significantly greater for older workers, 
married workers and workers with qualifications or previously employed in professional 
occupations. They are also greater for those with their own transport and those prepared 
to travel for longer. Workers who are prepared to travel for between 30 and 60 minutes 
have reservations wages 9 to 10 per cent higher than the reference category. This rises 
to 16% for those willing to travel for one hour or more. The reservation wages of 
women are 11 per cent lower than those for men.
35 This is consistent with the pattern of 
reservation wages described in Section III. It is also consistent with the observed gender 
wage gap differential reported in the empirical literature of wage determination.         1 8
Table 4 
Estimation Results for Full Sample 
   Instrumental  Variables 
 MLE  First Stage  Second Stage 
Dependent Variable  Log Duration  Log w
r Log  Duration 
Personal Characteristics         
Age 16-19  -0.314 (5.29)
† -0.066 (4.16)
† -0.337  (5.45)
† 
 30-39  0.121  (2.97)
† 0.063 (5.79)
† 0.133  (3.18)
† 
 40-49  0.181  (3.97)
† 0.075 (6.16)
† 0.194  (4.16)
† 
 50+  0.123  (2.46)
** 0.031 (2.34)
† 0.131  (2.61)
† 
Gender   -0.208 (5.28)
† -0.118 (11.33)
† -0.235  (5.29)
† 
Married or Living as a Couple   0.010  (0.27)  0.087 (8.97)
† 0.027  (0.70) 
Separated, Divorced or Widowed  0.001  (0.01)  0.033 (2.53)
** 0.009  (0.18) 
Health Problem  -0.038  (0.76)  -0.014 (1.04)  -0.044  (0.87) 
Literacy Problem  0.026  (0.30)  -0.005 (0.20)  0.016  (0.19) 
Have Own Transport  -0.653  (20.91)
† 0.023 (2.82)
† -0.647  (20.56)
† 
Want to Work Part-time  -0.070  (0.46)  -0.201 (4.98)
† -0.106  (0.68) 
Educational Attainment         
First or Higher Degree, HND or HNC  -0.076  (1.05)  0.046 (2.35)
** -0.067 (0.92) 
GCE A-level  -0.048  (0.72)  0.041 (2.33)
** -0.042 (0.63) 












Other Qualification   0.040  (0.61)  0.031 (1.76)
* 0.046  (0.69) 
Search Activity         
Newspapers & Journals  -0.020  (0.51)  0.075 (7.31)
† -0.006  (0.14) 
Private Employment Agency  -0.018  (0.16)  0.125 (4.39)
† 0.008  (0.07) 
Speculative Inquiry  -0.022  (0.37)  0.078 (4.98)
† -0.008  (0.13) 
Other   -0.407  (2.37)
** 0.045 (1.02) -0.398  (2.32)
** 
Travel Time (minutes)         
15-29   -0.151  (2.72)
† 0.039 (2.64)
† -0.144  (2.60)
† 
30-44   -0.094  (1.60)  0.092 (5.82)
† -0.079  (1.32) 
45-60   -0.097  (1.57)  0.083 (5.04)
† -0.081  (1.30) 
60+ -0.181  (3.10)
† 0.151 (9.61)
† -0.153  (2.46)
** 
Previous Job         
Managers and Administrators  -0.032  (0.49)  0.020 (1.12)  -0.023  (0.35) 
Professional Occupations  -0.060  (0.64)  0.002 (0.07)  -0.058  (0.62) 
Associate Professionals and Technical -0.114  (1.47)  -0.002 (0.11) -0.113  (1.46) 
Clerical and Secretarial  -0.114  (1.95)
** -0.079 (5.05)
† -0.127  (2.15)
** 
Personal and Protective Services  -0.082  (1.32)  -0.103 (6.21)
† -0.106  (1.64)
* 
Sales -0.184  (3.09)
† -0.071 (4.46)
† -0.205  (3.33)
† 
Plant and Machine Operatives  0.106  (2.05)
** -0.058 (4.10)
† 0.094  (1.79)
* 
Other Occupations  0.030  (0.65)  -0.070 (5.66)
† 0.014  (0.30) 
No Previous Job   0.090  (1.31)  -0.143 (7.80)
† 0.071  (1.02) 
District         
Ashford 0.164  (2.22)
** -0.012 (0.60)  0.164  (2.22)
** 
Canterbury 0.450  (6.70)
† -0.039 (2.14)
**  0.442 (6.55)
† 








Gillingham 0.261  (3.78)
† 0.011 (0.57)  0.265 (3.82)
† 




Rochester 0.097  (1.50)  0.053 (3.06)
† 0.107  (1.64)
* 
Sevenoaks -0.207  (1.67)
* 0.047 (1.44)  -0.200 (1.61) 
Shepway 0.101  (1.45)  0.001 (0.05)  0.103 (1.48) 
Swale -0.058  (0.84)  0.001 (0.06)  -0.058 (0.85) 




Tonbridge & Malling  0.057  (0.85)  0.003 (0.16)  0.060 (0.90) 
Tunbridge Wells  -0.008  (0.06)  -0.013 (0.31)  -0.007 (0.05)         1 9
Table 4 Continued 
 
 Structural  Instrumental  Variables 
 MLE  First  Stage Second  Stage 
Dependent Variable  Log Duration  Log w
r Log  Duration 
Log Reservation Wage (w
r) -0.061 (1.26)  -  -0.187  (1.75)
* 
Instruments      
Previously Self-employed  -  0.059 (5.63)
† - 
Log Previous Wage   -  0.300 (34.31)
† - 




Diagnostics      
F -  132.48  [0.00]  - 
LR χ
2  1156.77 - 1158.27 
R
2 -  0.5738  - 
Log Likelihood  -7191.5637  -  -7190.8152 
N 4,872  4,872  4,872 
 
Notes 
1.  Estimations by Intercooled Stata 6.0. Coefficient t-values in parentheses. Significance levels: 
†(0.01), 
**(0.05), 
*(0.10); p-values of diagnostics in []. 




Residential location has a significant impact on the reservation wage. Residing in 
Thanet depresses the reservation wage by just under 10 per cent. For Canterbury and 
Dover the reduction is between 3 and 4 per cent. Lower reservation wages may reflect 
 regional disparities in pay and/or skills. Average weekly wages are significantly lower 
in East Kent. This may reflect the latent employment/industrial structure of the region 
or a distance from London effect. However, it is also consistent with the 
disproportionately high number of workers without qualifications. Human Capital 
theory asserts that workers are remunerated according to their marginal product of 
labour. On this basis, less qualified workers can expect to earn less. Accordingly, 
reservation wages should also be lower. 
 
Search behaviour also yields a significant impact on reservation wages. Individuals who 
make speculative inquiries or use newspapers and journals have reservation wages 8 per 
cent higher than those who utilise job centres. For individuals using private employment 
agencies, the increase in the reservation wage is some 13 per cent. Hence, individuals 
who utilise alternative search methods expect to earn higher wages. This result may 
indicate that workers expect to be compensated for any additional costs incurred in the 
search process. It could, however, reflect the characteristics of the workers involved and 
the efficient matching of workers skills to employer needs. Qualified workers         2 0
disproportionately represent individuals who report using such methods. These workers 
have higher reservation wages: They expect to earn wages that reflect their higher 
marginal productivity. Thus, a positive association between reservation wages and 
alternative search methods may be expected. 
 
Column 3 reveals that the signs of parameter estimates for demographic and personal 
covariates on the log of unemployment duration are again as one would expect a priori. 
Age and gender have highly statistically significant effects on the probability of 
remaining unemployed. Women can expect to experience far shorter spells of 
unemployment than men, perhaps reflecting competing risks in the exit from 
unemployment. Younger workers can expect likewise. Workers aged between 16 and 19 
years experience unemployment durations 29 per cent shorter than those in the reference 
category. Workers aged 30 years or more, in contrast, can expect unemployment 
durations between 12 and 20 per cent longer. The presence of a health problem does not 
appear to be an important determinant of unemployment duration. Neither is marital 
status. Both results are somewhat surprising. The lack of statistical significance 
regarding health problems may reflect sampling bias in the unemployment register.
36 
The lack of significance for marital status is again likely to reflect differences in the 
experience of unemployment by gender.  
 
Individuals who possess at least some qualifications can expect significantly shorter 
spells of unemployment. Negative parameter estimates regarding educational attainment 
are consistent with human capital theory. However, it is the presence of broad-based 
qualifications that present the greatest reduction in the probability of remaining 
unemployed. Unemployed individuals with ‘O’-level or equivalent qualifications can 
expect unemployment durations 14% shorter than those individuals without formal 
qualifications. This rises to 22% for those with vocationally based NVQs. Both of these 
qualifications act as an entry-level screening device for both employers and academic 
institutions alike. The lack of such qualifications can thus be expected to have adverse 
consequences for individuals’ (re)employment probabilities.  
 
Previous occupation is a significant determinant of unemployment duration. It is well 
known that certain occupations are prone to a greater incidence of unemployment. The 
impact on unemployment duration is, however, less clear. In terms of our sample,         2 1
workers previously employed in semi-skilled occupations can expect shorter 
unemployment durations than the reference group of craft and related occupations. By 
contrast, unskilled workers previously employed as plant and machine operatives can 
expect longer durations. There is no statistically significant effect for those workers 
previously engaged in ‘professional’ and related occupations.  
 
Labour market mobility also has a vital role in determining the duration of 
unemployment. Individuals willing to travel in excess of one hour experience 
unemployment durations some 14% shorter than the reference category. More 
significantly, workers with their own transport experience significantly shorter 
unemployment durations regardless of travel time. This result is highly significant and 
indicates that lack of mobility may present a serious constraint to policies aimed at 
improving the long-term employability of the unemployed. Promoting the use of 
informal networks and ‘other’ search activities may help in this regard. Individuals who 
utilise such methods experience unemployment spells 33 per cent shorter than those 
utilising more formal methods. 
 
Regional variation in labour market opportunities also yields significant impacts on the 
length of time individuals can expect to remain unemployed. Individuals residing in the 
East and North Kent districts of Ashford, Dartford, and Rochester can expect 
unemployment durations between 11 and 18 per cent longer than those residing in the 
reference region of Maidstone (Mid-Kent). For Canterbury and Gillingham, the 
expected increase in unemployment duration is 56 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. 
The districts with significantly lower durations are the East and North Kent districts that 
report both the highest incidence of unemployment and the lowest proportions of long-
term unemployed. This result is somewhat surprising. However, as reported previously, 
these districts disproportionately represent unskilled workers. A high incidence of 
unemployment together with short unemployment durations suggests labour market 
‘churning’ in these districts may be considerable. This is consistent with the earlier 
hypothesis that such districts may consist of relatively poor employment opportunities. 
It also provides confirmation that, ceteris paribus, geographical variation in the arrival 
rate of job offers due to local demand conditions is a significant determinant of 
unemployment duration. 
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The socio-economic and demographic parameter estimates reported in the IV 
specification of column 3 are not systematically different from the structural estimates 
reported in column 1. The role of the log reservation wage on the log of unemployment 
duration also holds in this regard. Both specifications report a perverse negative sign on 
the log reservation wage though neither parameter estimate is statistically significant at 
conventional levels. A negative sign on the log reservation wage implies that higher 
reservation wages reduce the probability of remaining unemployed. Thus, 
unemployment duration should be shorter. This result is at odds with job search theory. 
However, one possible explanation may lie in the static nature of the cross-section data. 
The data entails that the focus of explanatory variables is on the incomplete duration of 
unemployment at a point in time (unemployment spells are right-censored). We have 
already reported that qualified workers, mobile workers, and workers utilising non-
traditional search methods have shorter durations of unemployment. These workers also 
report significantly higher reservation wages. Thus, a negative coefficient for the log 
reservation wage in the estimation of the log of unemployment duration may reflect 
strong correlation between such factors.  
 
The reduced form specification for the log of unemployment duration is appropriate if 
reservation wages are correlated with omitted variables. If there are omitted variables, 
parameter estimates for the IV specification will be consistent and unbiased, but the 
parameter estimate of the log of reservation wages in the structural specification will be 
biased. This bias can be tested formally using a Hausman test.
37 The null hypothesis of 
the Hausman test is that the IV and structural estimates have no measurement error. 
Under the null hypothesis, both estimators are consistent estimators, although the IV 
estimator is inefficient. The Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis of no 
misspecification. Thus, the structural equation is the appropriate method of estimation 




In order to confirm the generality and robustness of our results, two additional 
experiments were performed. Firstly, we investigated the validity of the instruments 
utilised in the first stage of the IV procedure. A good instrument for our econometric 
model is one that is correlated with the log reservation wage but not significantly 
correlated with the log of unemployment duration. The first-stage IV estimates reported         2 3
in column 2 of Table 4 indicate that, of our two chosen instruments, the log of previous 
earnings has a more significant correlation with the log reservation wage than whether 
the individual was previously self-employed. Since we have two instruments but only 
one variable to instrument, we can test the validity of one instrument by assuming the 
validity of the other. Thus, we test the validity of the log of previous earnings by 
including it in the second-stage duration equation where the self-employed variable is 
used as the sole instrument in the first stage. The parameter estimate for the log of 
previous earnings is positive but insignificant with a t-ratio of 0.53. This suggests that 
the over-identifying restriction that the log of previous earnings is a valid instrument is 
accepted.  
 
Secondly, we estimate our wage and duration equations separately for men and women. 
The full sample reveals that women experience significantly shorter unemployment 
durations than men. This contrast in the experience of unemployment is likely to reflect 
gender differences in the exit probability into non-participation. The inability to control 
for competing risks by gender may yield potential biases in parameter estimates when 
covariates are estimated over the full sample. Thus, re-estimating the econometric 
specifications for men and women separately should test whether our conclusions hold 
a fortiori. 
 
The results of estimating separate equations for men and women are reported in Tables 
A5 and A6 of the Appendix. These indicate significant variation in the determinants of 
unemployment duration across gender. Regardless of gender, older workers have both 
higher reservation wages and unemployment durations. The impact on unemployment 
duration is, however, only statistically significant at conventional levels for women 
aged 50 or over. The effect is also twice that observed for men. This may reflect labour 
market discrimination on the part of employers. Alternatively, it could reflect a greater 
accumulation of firm specific capital and hence greater hiring costs.  
 
Higher educational attainment significantly increases the reservation wages of men and 
women. Support for the shorter unemployment durations arising through broad based 
qualifications is also supported. The impact of ‘O’-level qualifications on the 
probability of remaining unemployed is broadly equivalent across gender. However, 
NVQs have no significant impact on female durations. This is likely to reflect sampling         2 4
bias and/or differences in participation. Nonetheless, support for ‘minimal’ levels of 
educational attainment suggest that policies aimed at the provision of training and 
improving workers skills may exercise potentially important impacts on improving the 
long-term employability of the unemployed.   
 
Marital status and health are important determinants of male reservation wages but have 
no significant effect on male unemployment duration. The converse is true for women. 
Unemployed women reported as separated, divorced or widowed experience 
unemployment spells some 15 per cent longer than those who are single. This may 
reflect greater non-labour income. Such information is not observed in the data set. 
However, the presence of such income is likely to result in greater choosiness by the 
unemployed in terms of their acceptance set of job offers and thus longer durations. 
Differential impacts by gender are also observed with regards to labour market mobility. 
Reservation wages are significantly higher for persons willing to travel for longer 
regardless of gender, perhaps reflecting the increased costs of search. A negative impact 
on unemployment duration is, however, only observed for men. Having one’s own 
transport significantly reduces the duration of unemployment regardless of gender. The 
effect on male durations is, however, almost twice that observed for females. 
 
Previous occupation exerts significant impacts on the reservation wages and 
unemployment duration of both genders. Professional occupations exert a significant 
negative on the unemployment duration of women. Managerial and clerical occupations 
perform likewise. Sales occupations have strong impacts on both females and males, 
reducing the duration of unemployment by 36 per cent and 23 per cent respectively. 
District dummies continue to exercise statistically significant effects on the duration of 
unemployment. Thus, our main finding that variation in the arrival rate of job offers has 
a significant impact on individuals’ unemployment experiences remains unaffected by 
this dichotomisation of the data. 
 
 
VII.  Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the impact of individual heterogeneity and local labour 
market opportunities on the duration of unemployment exploiting a unique regional 
dataset for the English County of Kent. Utilising an econometric model tied closely to         2 5
job search theory, our results reveal that individual characteristics and related ‘choice’ 
variables’ such as educational attainment, labour market mobility and job search 
behaviour exercise important impacts on the duration of unemployment. However, after 
controlling for such factors, there remain significant geographical variations. These 
results are robust for both males and females. They are also consistent with a number of 
previous studies that recognise the importance of individual characteristics in 
determining the risks associated with unemployment, and unemployment duration 
(Nickell, 1980; Jones, 1988; Gorter & Gorter, 1993).  
 
Identifying the role of geography and individual heterogeneity has important 
implications for policy. If the length of an unemployment spell is primarily attributable 
to the demographic and personal characteristics of the unemployed, economic policies 
should be targeted at altering those characteristics observed to exercise significant 
effects. In terms of resource management, the selection criteria for such policies should 
also focus on the duration of unemployment. This has been the basis of the New Deal, a 
government-supported training and re-employment program targeted at getting the long-
term unemployed back into employment. The New Deal is a key part of the 
Government's Welfare to Work strategy, and has helped over 560,000 people to find 
work over the past three years. The relative success of this program has resulted in a 
widening of the policy across a number of socio-economic groups including both the 
young and old, lone parents and those with a disability. The next phase of the program 
is intended to extend this coverage further.  
 
The existence of regional influences raises concern over the long-term efficacy of the 
New Deal program. Recognition that geography is important suggests that 
microeconomic supply-side policies designed to increase the employability of the 
unemployed need also be complemented with more macroeconomic demand-led 
management. This, in turn, implies a greater role for both regional and urban economic 
policies. These policies have witnessed an element of resurgence since the mid to late 
1990s with decentralisation of regional governance and greater emphasis on the central 
economic objective of high and stable levels of growth and employment. This revival 
represents a commitment towards the development of long-term partnerships between 
local government bodies, communities and employers alike. Our results provide broad 
support for this approach and indicate that urban based policies, alongside         2 6
neighbourhood renewal, are essential to providing the efficient matching of workers and 
employers at the sub regional level. They also suggest a more integrated strategy for the 
implementation of urban and regional policy, such as the recently created Frameworks for 
Regional Employment and Skills Action (FRESAs). 
                                                 
1 Claimant count data reveal that just under one half of the unemployed leave the register within 3 
months.  By contrast, one fifth of claimants remain unemployed after 1 year.   
2 Recent evidence from the labour force survey suggests 3½ million households with adult members of 
working age are without work. See Hastings (1997) for further details.  
3 The increased availability of good, reliable microeconomic data, alongside the development of related 
econometric techniques, has also contributed to this cause (Lancaster, 1990). 
4 Oswald (1997) provides some evidence for the (un)happiness of unemployed workers. 
5 See Layard et al (1991) for details. 
6 Jackman et al (1989) have utilised this decomposition extensively to show that changes in UK 
unemployment between the 1960s and 1980s can be attributed to changes in duration that arise from a 
marked downward trend in the outflow rate from unemployment.  
7 Equivalent data at the county level, for example, reveals variation in ILO unemployment for the South-
East to be between 2.5% and 8.2%. Analysis of claimant count data at the level of the Local Authority 
District (LAD) underscores this pattern further. 
8 With few exceptions, setting a low reservation wage or being willing to consider a broad range of jobs 
has no significant impact on the conditional probability of exit from unemployment. 
9 Data on reservation wages is extremely rare. In the absence of such information, studies tend to utilise 
information regarding the eligibility for benefit or the receipt of such benefit to model individual choice 
indirectly.  
10 See DfES (2002) for details. 
11 In this framework, the job is completely characterised by the wage. 
12 Devine & Kiefer (1991) provide an excellent survey of the empirical literature. 
13 See Atkinson & Micklewright (1992) for a critical review.  
14 The authors conclude that earlier results indicating high levels of search effort amongst benefit 
recipients relative to non-recipients probably reflect participatory factors brought about by selectivity bias 
in the estimation procedure. 
15 See Atkinson et al (1984) for an examination of the sensitivity of the hazard rate across workers. 
16 The idea that past unemployment experience may determine current unemployment is recognised as 
‘state dependence’ in the statistical literature and ‘scarring’ in the economics literature. 
17 Such policies may focus on the demand- or supply-side of the labour market. Supply-side 
considerations emphasise depreciation in skills (Sinfield, 1981) and worker demoralisation (Pissarides, 
1985). Demand-side considerations stress the importance of firms’ hiring functions and associated roles 
of discrimination (Harrison, 1976) and screening (Lockwood, 1991; Pissarides, 1992).  
18 See Mortensen & Neumann (1984) for details. 
19 Information concerning employment opportunities may be derived from both formal and informal 
methods. Formal methods include the use of employment agencies, direct approaches to employers, 
and/or responses to advertisements in newspapers and journals. Informal methods, by contrast, may 
utilise social networks (friends & relatives) and ports of access to internal labour markets. 
20 The unemployed individual may decide to become choosier for a given increase in the arrival rate of 
job offers. 
21 It should, of course, be noted that one reason why offer rejections are typically rare is because the 
rejection of an offer may often mean disqualification from unemployment insurance payments. 
22 NOMIS records for October 1992 reveal that 78% of Kent’s unemployed constituted men, with 22% 
women. The survey sample of 5,392 individuals comprises 76% men and 24% women. 
23 The survey slightly under-represents persons unemployed between 0 and 3 months, and 12 months & 
over. Similarly, persons unemployed between 3 and 12 months are slightly over-represented.  
24 One exception to this is that we include those individuals who either fail to report the wage earned from 
their previous employment or have a missing response to the question on the basis that they have not 
previously worked. For these individuals, the previous wage is imputed from existing data.  
25 We presume that the incidence of invalid responses is independent of the nature of other responses. 
Data mining provides credence here. Extensive cross-tabulations reveal that the estimable sample is 
representative of the survey design. Hence, selected individuals appear to be a fairly random draw.         2 7
                                                                                                                                               
26 The distribution is estimated using kernel density estimation and constraining the upper bound of 
unemployment duration to 30 months.  
27 This is particularly evident for married women who often consider employment in order to provide 
households with a secondary income  
28 Marital status is also important here with married women being identified as least likely to commute 
greater times (and hence distances). 
29 These differentials are highlighted in the construction of a variable that reflects the ratio of reservation 
wages to previous earnings. This ratio has a mean of 1.051 in the sample with a standard deviation of 
0.678 and a median of 0.999. 
30 This partially reflects the nature of the benefit administration scheme in the UK. 
31 The fourteen districts considered are: Ashford, Canterbury, Dartford, Dover, Gillingham, Gravesham, 
Maidstone, Medway, Rochester, Sevenoaks, Shepway, Swale, Thanet, Tonbridge & Malling, and 
Tunbridge Wells. 
32 The empirical methodology developed here is that of Jones (1988). 
33 See Lancaster (1990) for details. 
34 State dependence in the reservation wage also yields concerns for the estimation of equation (10). In 
general, state dependence entails that progression from equation (1) to equation (2) will no longer be 
valid. In this instance, the duration of unemployment and individuals’ reservation wages may be 
considered as 2 endogenous variables in a simultaneous system. Lancaster (1985) demonstrates that under 
certain assumptions, a tractable expression for the reservation wage in a simultaneous system may be 
derived where the duration specification remains as in equation (10). This specification again warrants the 
use of instrumental variables to deal with the potential endogeneity bias outlined above. See Heath & 
Swan (1999) for additional details.  
35 Percentage differentials are calculated as 
i 100 (e 1)
β × − . See Halvorsen & Palmquist (1980). 
36 Disney & Webb (1991) reveal that there has been a significant upward trend in the receipt of long-term 
sickness benefits. This trend appears to be positively correlated with higher unemployment but insensitive 
to reductions in the aggregate unemployment rate. They tentatively suggest that this discrepancy may be 
due to asymmetry in the relationship between unemployment and sickness benefits. It could, however, 
also reflect changing eligibility conditions for other benefits (such as unemployment benefit).  
37 See Hausman (1978). 
38 This result is consistent with Gorter & Gorter (1993) but contrasts with Dolton & O’Neil (1995) and 
Warren (1999) both of whom report the reservation wage as having a significant positive effect on the 
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Unemployment Duration and Age  
  Unemployment Duration (months) 
Age of Individual  0 to 3   3-6  6-12  12-18  18-24  24+  Total 
16-19   129  124  96  24  7  2  382 
20-29  584 468 439 157  74 114  1,839 
30-39  310 236 251 100  69  74  1,040 
40-49  243 241 200  83  56  67  890 
50+  219 163 176  60  32  71  721 




Unemployment Duration and Educational Attainment 
  Unemployment Duration (months) 
Highest Qualification  0 to 3   3-6  6-12  12-18  18-24  24+  Total 
Degree,  HND/HNC    88 70 70 24 11 13  276 
A-level  110 62 61 20 14 15  282 
City & Guilds  211  152  164  57  29  34  647 
O-level or Equivalent  478  362  313  78  42  44  1,317 
NVQ  22 21 16  5  4  3  71 
Other  Qualifications  61 62 60 33 10 17  243 
No  Qualification  515 503 478 207 128 205  2,036 




Unemployment Duration and Residence 
  Unemployment Duration (months) 
District  0 to 3   3-6  6-12  12-18  18-24  24+  Total 
Ashford  73 72 70 32 17 30  294 
Canterbury  82 66  117 57 46 60  428 
Dartford  106 62 75 47 39 36  365 
Dover 194  124  76  1  0  0  395 
Gillingham  75 85  105 56 33 47  401 
Gravesham  94 51 37 13  5  6  206 
Maidstone  123 100 129  28  12  21  413 
Rochester  126 115 127  54  24  34  480 
Sevenoaks  27 22 17  6  1  0  73 
Shepway  116 70 80 54 27 47  394 
Swale  131 115 107  24  14  24  415 
Thanet  205 219 115  5  1  2  547 
Tonbridge  &  Malling  119  120 95 44 17 22  417 
Tunbridge  Wells  14 11 12  3  2  2  44 
Total  1,485 1,232 1,162  424  238  331  4,872         3 3
Table A4 




  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Dependent Variables        
  Log of Unemployment Duration             
  Log of Reservation Wage  5.086  0.389  5.170  0.367  4.823  0.339 
Independent Variables        
  Gender (1,0 if female)  0.241    -    -   
  Age  34.10 12.23 34.84 12.28 31.80 11.78 
Marital Status        
  Never Married (reference)  0.463    0.460    0.472   
  Married or Living as a Couple   0.399    0.414    0.352   
  Separated, Divorced or Widowed  0.138    0.126    0.176   
Highest Qualification        
  First or Higher Degree, HND or HNC  0.057    0.057    0.054   
  GCE A-level  0.058    0.053    0.074   
  City & Guilds  0.133    0.156    0.060   
  GCE O-level or equivalent  0.270    0.230    0.396   
    NVQ  0.015  0.013  0.019  
  Other Qualification   0.050    0.053    0.041   
    No  Qualification  (reference)  0.417  0.438  0.356  
Search Methods        
  Job Centre (reference)  0.728    0.718    0.760   
  Newspapers & Journals  0.180    0.178    0.189   
  Private Employment Agency  0.018    0.017    0.022   
  Speculative Inquiry  0.067    0.079    0.026   
  Other   0.007    0.008    0.003   
Travel Time         
  0-14 Mins. (reference)  0.090    0.073    0.141   
  15-29 Mins.   0.233    0.185    0.386   
  30-44 Mins.   0.192    0.188    0.205   
  45-60 Mins.   0.145    0.158    0.106   
  60+ Mins.  0.340    0.396    0.162   
Previous Occupation        
  Managers and Administrators  0.066    0.071    0.049   
    Professional  Occupations  0.031  0.032  0.026  
  Associate Professionals and Technical  0.043    0.045    0.040   
  Clerical and Secretarial  0.108    0.062    0.252   
  Craft and Related (reference)  0.218    0.276    0.036   
  Personal and Protective Services  0.078    0.052    0.161   
    Sales  0.090  0.062  0.180  
  Plant and Machine Operatives  0.113    0.134    0.045   
  Other Occupations  0.188    0.210    0.117   
  No Previous Job   0.065    0.056    0.094   
Other Personal Controls        
  Health Problem  0.088    0.087    0.092   
  Literacy Problem  0.028    0.031    0.019   
  Have Own Transport  0.385    0.407    0.313   
  Want to Work Part-time  0.009    0.004    0.023   
  Previously Self-employed  0.184    0.234    0.028   
  Log of Previous Wage  5.134  0.553  5.247  0.511  4.782  0.534 
District        
    Ashford  0.060  0.061  0.057  
    Canterbury  0.088  0.094  0.070  
    Dartford  0.075  0.074  0.079  
    Dover  0.081  0.082  0.078  
    Gillingham  0.082  0.081  0.086          3 4
    Gravesham  0.042  0.041  0.045  
    Maidstone  (reference)  0.085  0.085  0.083  
  Rochester   0.099    0.102    0.089   
    Sevenoaks  0.015  0.012  0.026  
    Shepway  0.081  0.087  0.062  
    Swale  0.085  0.078  0.107  
    Thanet  0.112  0.114  0.106  
  Tonbridge & Malling  0.086    0.081    0.101   
    Tunbridge  Wells  0.009  0.008  0.011  
 
         3 5
Table A5 
Estimation Results for Male Sample 
   Instrumental  Variables 
 MLE  IV First Stage  IV Second Stage 
Dependent Variable  Log Duration  Log w
r Log  Duration 
Log Reservation Wage (w
r) -0.029  (1.63)  -  -  -0.234  (1.94)
* 
Instruments         
Previously Self-employed  -  -  0.048 (4.58)
† -  - 
Log Previous Wage   -  -  0.313 (31.20)
† -  - 
Personal Characteristics         
Age 16-19  -0.373 (5.09)
† -0.101 (5.34)
† -0.423  (5.46)
† 
 30-39  0.129  (2.79)
† 0.067 (5.60)
† 0.151  (3.17)
† 
 40-49  0.207  (3.94)
† 0.085 (6.20)
† 0.233  (4.31)
† 
 50+  0.086  (1.50) 0.021 (1.39)  0.100  (1.74)
* 
Married or Living as a Couple   0.007  (0.17)  0.107 (9.74)
† 0.041  (0.89) 
Separated, Divorced or Widowed  -0.064  (1.14)  0.032 (2.21)
** -0.050 (0.88) 
Health Problem  -0.040  (0.67)  -0.033 (2.18)
** -0.054 (0.91) 
Literacy Problem  0.026  (0.29)  -0.003 (0.10)  -0.042  (0.45) 
Have Own Transport  -0.722  (20.25)
† 0.025 (2.68)
† -0.713  (19.83)
† 
Want to Work Part-time  -0.049  (0.19)  -0.154 (2.34)
** -0.104 (0.40) 
Educational Attainment         
First or Higher Degree, HND or HNC  -0.028  (0.34)  0.028 (1.31)  -0.013  (0.16) 
GCE A-level  -0.010  (0.13)  0.033 (1.65)
* -0.003  (0.03) 
City & Guilds  -0.100  (1.97)
** 0.014 (1.06) -0.091  (1.78)
* 
GCE O-level or Equivalent  -0.153  (3.38)
† 0.006 (0.53)  -0.151  (3.33)
† 
NVQ -0.337  (2.38)
** 0.050 (1.36) -0.320  (2.26)
** 
Other Qualification   0.039  (0.53)  0.024 (1.23)  0.046  (0.62) 
Search Activity         
Newspapers & Journals  -0.039  (0.85)  0.077 (6.60)
† -0.012  (0.26) 
Private Employment Agency  -0.015  (0.11)  0.104 (3.12)
† 0.026  (0.20) 
Speculative Inquiry  -0.033  (0.52)  0.089 (5.51)
† -0.004  (0.07) 
Other   -0.292  (1.63)  0.022 (0.47)  -0.279  (1.55) 
Travel Time (minutes)         




30-44   -0.175  (2.41)
** 0.088 (4.64)
† -0.150  (2.05)
** 
45-60   -0.126  (1.71)
* 0.073 (3.81)
† -0.101  (1.36) 
60+ -0.238  (3.40)
† 0.136 (7.45)
† -0.193  (2.62)
† 
Previous Job         
Managers and Administrators  -0.006  (0.09)  0.016 (0.83)  0.065  (0.09) 
Professional Occupations  -0.002  (0.18)  -0.004 (0.14)  -0.001  (0.00) 
Associate Professionals and Technical  -0.201  (2.31)
** -0.010 (0.47)  -0.201  (2.31) 
Clerical and Secretarial  -0.099 (1.32)  -0.081 (4.15)
† -0.127  (1.66)
* 
Personal and Protective Services  -0.090  (1.14)  -0.106 (5.16)
† -0.130  (1.60) 
Sales -0.231  (3.10)
† -0.070 (3.66)
† -0.267  (3.48)
† 
Plant and Machine Operatives  0.140  (2.55)
** -0.052 (3.58)
† 0.121  (2.18)
** 
Other Occupations  0.027  (0.55)  -0.061 (4.79)
† 0.004  (0.09) 
No Previous Job   0.117  (1.44)  -0.154 (7.32)
† 0.085  (1.03) 
District         
Ashford 0.187  (2.20)
** 0.008 (0.38)  0.191  (2.25)
** 




Dartford 0.182  (2.22)
 ** 0.082 (3.83)
† 0.205 (2.47)
** 
Dover -0.552  (6.69)
† -0.025 (1.19)  -0.559 (6.78)
† 
Gillingham 0.269  (3.35)
† 0.052 (2.47)
**  0.284 (3.53)
† 




Rochester 0.157  (2.12)
** 0.076 (3.95)
† 0.180  (2.41)
** 
Sevenoaks -0.220  (1.38)  0.027 (0.66)  -0.218 (1.36) 
Shepway 0.095  (1.20)  0.014 (0.67)  0.101 (1.27) 
Swale -0.015  (0.19)  0.008 (0.39)  -0.012 (0.16)         3 6




Tonbridge & Malling  0.107  (1.38)  0.027 (1.31)  0.117 (1.50) 
Tunbridge Wells  0.011  (0.06)  -0.029 (0.61)  0.008 (0.04) 
Constant  2.284 (7.80)
† 3.443 (60.05)
† 3.332  (5.57)
† 
Diagnostics     
F -  90.63  [0.00]  - 
LR χ
2  960.61 -  964.25 
R
2  - 0.5439  - 
Log Likelihood  -5524.5598  -  -5522.7392 
N 3,697  3,697  3,697 
 
Notes 
1.  See notes to Table 4. 
2.  The Hausman test accepts the null hypothesis of no misspecification. χ
2(47)=3.59[1.00]. 
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Table A6 
Estimation Results for Female Sample 
   Instrumental  Variables 
 MLE  IV First Stage  IV Second Stage 
Dependent Variable  Log Duration  Log w
r Log  Duration 
Log Reservation Wage (w
r) -0.267  (2.80)  -  -  -0.085  (0.34) 
Instruments         
Previously Self-employed  -  -  0.075 (1.55)  -  - 
Log Previous Wage   -  -  0.245 (13.84)
† -  - 
Personal Characteristics         
Age 16-19  -0.142 (1.43)  -0.024 (0.84)  -0.126 (1.23) 
 30-39  0.131  (1.58) 0.046 (1.94)
* 0.119  (1.40) 
 40-49  0.059  (0.64) 0.050 (1.88)
* 0.045  (0.48) 
 50+  0.279  (2.66)
† 0.056 (1.81)
* 0.264  (2.48)
** 
Married or Living as a Couple   0.024  (0.33)  0.020 (0.97)  0.017  (0.23) 
Separated, Divorced or Widowed  0.164  (1.77)
* 0.033 (1.27) 0.157  (1.68)
* 
Health Problem  -0.051  (0.52)  0.029 (1.04)  -0.054  (0.55) 
Literacy Problem  0.244  (1.23)  0.006 (0.11)  0.249  (1.26) 
Have Own Transport  -0.375  (5.89)
† 0.020 (1.11)  -0.382  (5.92)
† 
Want to Work Part-time  -0.144  (0.77)  -0.220 (4.16)
† -0.096  (0.49) 
Educational Attainment         
First or Higher Degree, HND or HNC  -0.189  (1.23)  0.113 (2.58)
† -0.212  (1.36) 
GCE A-level  -0.139  (1.16)  0.072 (2.09)
** -0.155 (1.27) 
City & Guilds  -0.007  (0.05)  0.094 (2.56)
** -0.027 (0.21) 
GCE O-level or Equivalent  -0.128  (1.72)
* 0.078 (3.65)
† -0.146  (1.88)
* 
NVQ -0.071  (0.34)  0.127 (2.14)
** -0.109 (0.52) 
Other Qualification   0.084  (0.59)  0.040 (0.96)  0.071  (0.50) 
Search Activity         
Newspapers & Journals  0.044  (0.59)  0.061 (2.89)
† 0.030  (0.39) 
Private Employment Agency  0.007  (0.03)  0.141 (2.58)
† -0.023  (0.11) 
Speculative Inquiry  0.099  (0.56)  -0.042 (0.84)  0.113  (0.64) 
Other   -  -  0.175 (1.32)  -  - 
Travel Time (minutes)         
15-29   -0.046  (0.52)
† 0.041 (1.59)  -0.054  (0.61) 
30-44   0.075  (0.76)  0.074 (2.57)
† 0.059  (0.58) 
45-60   -0.097  (0.81)  0.060 (1.75)
* -0.109  (0.90) 
60+ -0.105  (0.90)  0.147 (4.42)
† -0.139  (1.11) 
Previous Job         
Managers and Administrators  -0.336  (1.78)
* 0.069 (1.25)  -0.366  (1.89)
* 
Professional Occupations  -0.494  (2.05)
** 0.088 (1.27) -0.520  (2.12)
** 
Associate Professionals and Technical  -0.001  (0.00)  0.094 (1.61)  -0.120  (0.10) 
Clerical and Secretarial  -0.335  (2.19)
** -0.021 (0.46)  -0.331  (2.16)
** 
Personal and Protective Services  -0.294  (1.89)
* -0.091 (1.98)
** -0.263 (1.64) 
Sales -0.331  (2.15)
** -0.047 (1.04)  -0.308  (1.97)
* 
Plant and Machine Operatives -0.329  (1.75)
* -0.104 (1.89)
* -0.309  (1.62) 
Other Occupations  -0.185  (1.15)  -0.095 (1.99)
** -0.152 (0.92) 
No Previous Job   -0.198  (1.17)  -0.103 (2.06)
** -0.173 (1.01) 
District         
Ashford 0.003  (0.02)  -0.075 (1.75)
* 0.013  (0.09) 
Canterbury 0.539  (3.92)
† -0.011 (0.27)  0.544 (3.93)
† 
Dartford 0.041  (0.30)  -0.011 (0.28)  0.040 (0.29) 
Dover -0.502  (3.55)
† -0.033 (0.82)  -0.495 (3.49)
† 
Gillingham 0.152  (1.14) -0.105 (2.70)
† 0.173 (1.27) 
Gravesham -0.215  (1.35)  -0.047 (1.03)  -0.213 (1.33) 
Rochester -0.122  (0.95)  -0.016 (0.43)  0.121  (0.94) 
Sevenoaks -0.206  (1.07)  0.045 (0.81)  -0.221 (1.13) 
Shepway 0.102  (0.70)  -0.045 (1.06)  0.104 (0.71) 
Swale -0.172  (1.35)  -0.008 (0.23)  -0.165 (1.30)         3 8




Tonbridge & Malling  -0.083  (0.66)  -0.061 (1.65)
* -0.075 (0.59) 
Tunbridge Wells  -0.180  (0.65)  0.001 (0.01)  -0.196 (0.71) 
Constant  -3.249 (6.62)
† 3.572 (35.12) 2.389  (1.99)
** 
Diagnostics     
F -  17.53  [0.00]  - 
LR χ
2  228.54 -  220.82 
R
2  - 0.4276  - 
Log Likelihood  -1625.1663  -  -1.629.0303 
N 1,175  1,175  1,175 
 
Notes 
1.  See notes to Table 4. 
2.  Stata 6.0 drops ‘other’ search method from estimation of unemployment duration on the basis that 
observations are only recorded for women experiencing an unemployment spell of between 0 and 3 
months. 
3.  The Hausman test accepts the null hypothesis of no misspecification. χ
2(46)=2.44[1.00]. 
 